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THRESHOLD LIBERTY
Dawinder S. Sidhu†

The Supreme Court’s Thirteenth Amendment precedent is no longer
sustainable. For starters, that precedent—which holds that the Amendment prohibits
the “badges and incidents” of slavery, and that Congress has the power to “rationally”
determine what constitutes a “badge or incident” of slavery—raises serious
federalism and separation of powers concerns. To make matters worse, the Court
itself has recently restricted the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment (in City of Boerne v. Flores) and Fifteenth Amendment (in Shelby
County v. Holder), rendering the generous bounds of the Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power an outlier among the Reconstruction Amendments.
To ensure that the Thirteenth Amendment has modern application in a
manner consistent with these important constitutional considerations and these
cases, the Amendment should no longer be interpreted to prohibit the “badges and
incidents” of slavery, a non-textual category of harms that is virtually limitless in
scope and is therefore virtually limitless as a source of congressional action. Instead,
drawing from the Amendment’s textual prohibitions against “slavery” and
“involuntary servitude,” direct or functional limitations on physical mobility should
be the touchstone for the enforcement power moving forward.
To justify this proposal, this Article summarizes the Supreme Court’s
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, elaborates on the twin problems with this
precedent, explores labor- and consent-based alternatives to the current model, and
explains why a mobility-based approach enjoys more constitutional and historical
support. To demonstrate the proposal’s workability, this Article shows how a
mobility-centric model would apply to eight modern situations.
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INTRODUCTION
The liberty of individuals may be restricted to such a degree that
physical mobility is absent for those individuals. Slavery exemplifies this
situation, one in which limitations on liberty were the product of
affirmative subjugation.
What if the liberty of individuals was limited not out of animus or
direct action, but out of neglect and indifference? What if the
individuals, released from any physical restraints, were nonetheless
functionally restrained? What if the individuals possessed limited
physical mobility, such that they were segregated from and unable to
participate in mainstream society? What if these individuals were not
localized in any one state, but existed throughout the nation? Would the
federal government be powerless to step in, and thus be a bystander to
the limited liberty of these Americans?
The political process would not correct this situation and restore
the liberty of these individuals to a minimal level. This is because these
individuals may contribute little to campaigns and thus cannot
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effectively incentivize elected officials to divert attention to their
circumstances. 1 The Spending Clause could allow Congress to attach
relevant strings to federal monies, though this approach would hinge on
the willingness of each of the implicated states to agree to a deal. 2 The
Commerce Clause places in Congress’s hands an instrument that may
not be useful or reliable here, as the absence of liberty is not itself an
economic activity, 3 and the instrument itself has been blunted by recent
Supreme Court decisions. 4
The existing individual rights paradigm is similarly unavailing. The
Equal Protection Clause, which speaks to equal treatment, would not
address this problem, which concerns not equality or relative wealth,

1 See Randall Kennedy, Professor, Harvard Law School, America’s Deepest Fault Line:
Address at the Center for Social Cohesion Conference: Can the United States Remain United?
(June 13, 2011) (“Impoverishment means for many living apart from the so-called ‘mainstream
American society,’ the sectors of a society to which politicians pay some heed.”); see also Anmol
Chaddha & William Julius Wilson, “Way Down in the Hole”: Systematic Urban Inequality and
The Wire, 38 CRITICAL INQUIRY 164, 178 (2011) (“[P]olitical institutions have not been vehicles
for pursuing meaningful improvements in the conditions of the black urban poor, even when
black officials have been elected to office.”); David Cole, Foreword, Discretion and
Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J.
1059, 1062 (1999) (“Reliance on the political process . . . will simply ensure that minority
interests within inner-city communities will be ignored.”).
2 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (“The
legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending power ‘thus rests on whether the State
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.”’” (quoting Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981))). The Supreme Court’s opinion in NFIB,
invalidating Congress’s attempt to induce states, through additional funding, to expand their
Medicaid coverage, suggests that greater scrutiny will be given to Spending Clause conditions
more generally. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending
Clause after NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864 (2013) (“The implications of that holding are
potentially massive,” as the decision “certainly revive[s] the challenges to . . . laws [enacted
under the Spending Clause],” and could “seriously threaten the constitutionality of a broad
swath of federal spending legislation.”); see also Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending after
NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 662 (2013)
(indicating that even if the courts are not inclined to strike down conditions, Congress and
agencies should “take heed” of NFIB in proposing and overseeing spending actions).
3 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that gender-motivated
violence is not an economic activity and thus a federal statute giving victims of such violence a
private right of action could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that possession of a gun in a school zone is not an
economic activity and thus the federal criminal prohibition of such possession could not be
sustained under the Commerce Clause).
4 Randy Barnett, who is credited with generating the challengers’ legal arguments in NFIB,
wrote after the decision that while the Supreme Court upheld the minimum coverage provision
of the Affordable Care Act, the challengers “won” because the Court imposed limits on the
Commerce Clause. Randy Barnett, Opinion, We Lost on Health Care. But the Constitution
Won, WASH. POST, June 29, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/randy-barnettwe-lost-on-health-care-but-the-constitution-won/2012/06/29/gJQAzJuJCW_story.html.
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but a failure of individuals to occupy a certain baseline of liberty. 5 Nor
would substantive due process be of any help, as courts do not recognize
a fundamental right to a certain capacity to participate in society. 6
This Article argues that Congress may address these severe
limitations on physical liberty by way of the Thirteenth Amendment. 7 It
posits that whereas Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment by itself
prohibits actual limitations on physical mobility by way of enslavement
and bondage of individuals, Section Two’s enforcement power permits
Congress to address the functional or effective deprivation of physical
mobility.
This Article acknowledges, and seeks to resolve, the growing
dispute in the courts and among legal scholars as to the proper meaning
of the Thirteenth Amendment. There are significant concerns about the
Supreme Court’s Thirteenth Amendment precedent. First, the Supreme
Court has broadened the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment beyond
the text of the Amendment to include the “badges and incidents” of
slavery, 8 a category of harms that is conceivably unlimited given the vast
ways in which slaves were mistreated. 9 Second, the Supreme Court has
left to Congress the task of determining what constitutes a “badge[]” or
“incident[]” of slavery. 10 The virtually limitless scope of harms
perpetrated against slaves and the allowance of Congress to define that
scope raise two major problems: that Congress can use the Thirteenth
Amendment to regulate aspects of individual conduct that are typically
reserved for regulation by the States, and that Congress may effectively
fix the meaning of the Amendment despite the fact that our
constitutional system assigns that interpretive role to the courts. 11 The
courts’ ability to correct this dual overreaching is limited, because the
Supreme Court has instructed that the Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power is subject only to a rationality review. In short, in
the Thirteenth Amendment context, there is significant concern that

5 See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The
Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.”).
6 Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) (declaring in the context of holding that
there is no fundamental right to welfare benefits for the poor, that “neither the State nor
Federal Government is under any sort of constitutional obligation to guarantee minimum levels
of support”).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
8 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
9 See United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[N]early every hurtful
thing one human could do to another and nearly every disadvantaged state of being might be
analogized to slavery—and thereby labeled a badge or incident of slavery . . . .”).
10 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
11 These concerns are addressed more fully in Part II, infra.
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Congress may address a boundless universe of harms, squeezing state
sovereignty and usurping judicial functions in the process.
Some entrepreneurial scholars are urging Congress to seize this
opportunity to address a wide range of social problems. 12 Despite any
social good that might arise from Congress’s opportunistic use of the
Amendment, such use may come at the cost of encroaching on proper
responsibilities of the states as well as functions of the courts. If the
status quo is not sustainable, neither should the Thirteenth
Amendment, as others suggest, be reduced to a dead letter by confining
its scope only to slavery proper. 13
This Article seeks to respond to the federalism and separation of
powers flaws in the current model, while at the same time ensuring that
the Amendment has some modern applicability. Congress may use its
Thirteenth Amendment power to address not only direct, but also
functional, limitations on physical mobility. This Article addresses only
the appropriate ends of Thirteenth Amendment legislation, leaving
undisturbed the deferential rationality standard applied to the means
chosen by Congress.
Taking this principled middle path would mean that every instance
of discrimination would not be converted into a federally cognizable
harm. But it would ensure that the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
power is not read completely out of the Constitution and that it has
some defined meaning and continuing relevance. It would ensure also
that the Thirteenth Amendment is available in limited circumstances to
address only the deprivation of essential physical liberty: the liberty
necessary for physical mobility, what I call “threshold liberty.”
In order to make this case, Part I of this Article offers an overview
of the origins, historical understanding, and current approach to the
12 See Gail Heriot & Alison Schmauch Somin, Sleeping Giant?: Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Hate Crimes Legislation, and Academia’s Favorite New Vehicle for the Expansion
of Federal Power, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 31, 35–36 (2012) (listing what
“progressive” academics proposed as uses of the Section Two power). Scholars have been
observing that the Thirteenth Amendment is underutilized and that Congress should strike
when it can regulate the “badges and incidents” of slavery subject only to rationality review. See,
e.g., Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism Through
the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1849 (2006) (“Despite the Court’s
recognition of broad congressional authority to define the incidents and badges of involuntary
servitude, Congress has rarely exercised its enforcement power under the Thirteenth
Amendment.”); Jennifer R. Hagan, Comment, Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the War?:
The Fight Against Domestic Violence After the Death of Title III of the Violence Against Women
Act, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 919, 959 (2001) (“The Thirteenth Amendment represents a rarely used
constitutional weapon, designed to provide Congress with the power to remedy occasions of
involuntary servitude . . . .”).
13 Heriot & Somin, supra note 12, at 34 (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment should
prohibit only “actual slavery and involuntary servitude,” and that the stringent standard
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power should apply to the Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement power).
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Thirteenth Amendment. Part II identifies the twin problems with that
current framework. Part III suggests why the Thirteenth Amendment
applies to situations in which threshold liberty is denied, and explains
why alternative formulations predicated on consent or labor fall short.
Part IV applies the mobility-centric standard to eight areas that scholars
claim are fertile ground for Thirteenth Amendment legislation, showing
which four would be proper for Congress to enter and which four would
be off-limits. Part V concludes.
Circuit courts increasingly are knocking on the ceiling, asking for
the Justices above to respond to their concerns about the current state of
the Thirteenth Amendment. 14 In response to these calls for action, this
Article advances a fresh perspective that bestows on the Amendment the
limited, but critical, role of restoring basic liberty in areas where it has
been depleted. This Article aims to be useful as judges and practitioners
continue to grapple with the modern meaning of this post–Civil War
provision, and as the Justices consider the growing demands for an
updated, constitutionally sound understanding of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
This Part provides an overview of the Thirteenth Amendment. In
particular, it addresses the historical context, purposes, and early
interpretations of the Amendment; surveys the evolution of the
Amendment’s meaning over time; and summarizes the Supreme Court’s
current take on the scope of the Amendment.
A.

Historical Background to the Thirteenth Amendment

Traditionally, individuals inherit their sovereign. The Framers,
once separated from England, were in the unique position of being able
to create their own political community. 15 In the first Federalist,
Alexander Hamilton warned that how the Framers responded to this
opportunity would determine whether men were “really capable or not
of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether
they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on

14 See infra Part II (containing examples of decisions in which circuit courts have effectively
encouraged the Supreme Court to revisit prevailing Thirteenth Amendment precedent).
15 See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1783–1789, at xvi (2015) (suggesting that the first American revolution threw off
British rule, and the second was the establishment of a republican form of government).
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accident and force.” 16 In the words of Thomas Paine, the Framers had
“it in our power to begin the world over again.” 17
Recognizing this unique chance, the Framers created “one great,
respectable, and flourishing empire,”18 one that Thomas Jefferson
termed an “[E]mpire of [L]iberty.” 19 The Framers appointed the people
as the American sovereign, making government dependent upon the
consent of the governed and thereby subordinating government to the
people themselves. 20 They also enshrined certain rights in the
Constitution, shielding individual liberty from governmental
interference or intrusion, and the whims of the mob. 21 They also built a
structure to check governmental overreaching and minimize
encroachments on individual liberty. 22
For all its virtues, 23 the Constitution was flawed. It was designed to
primarily benefit white men and excluded people of color, particularly
blacks, from its grand pronouncements of freedom and equality. 24 It
failed to retrofit existing practices into the new order of the day,
reducing the American vision of liberty and opportunity to one that was
at best partial or incomplete. 25

THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 120 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1776).
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison).
19 See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING
OF THE REPUBLIC 228 (2008).
20 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1876) (summarizing the basic political theory
of the country).
21 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of
a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”).
22 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of
governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers
among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government
accountable but also to secure individual liberty.”).
23 Judge Learned Hand called the U.S. Constitution the “best political document ever
made.” LEARNED HAND, Morals in Public Life (1951), reprinted in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY:
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 225, 251–52 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1960).
24 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 388 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“When the colonists determined to seek their independence
from England, they drafted a unique document . . . proclaiming as ‘self-evident’ that ‘all men
are created equal’ and are endowed ‘with certain unalienable Rights’ . . . . The self-evident
truths and the unalienable rights were intended, however, to apply only to white men.”).
25 See id. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our Nation was
founded on the principle that ‘all Men are created equal.’ Yet candor requires acknowledgment
that the Framers of our Constitution, to forge the 13 Colonies into one Nation, openly
compromised this principle of equality with its antithesis: slavery.”).
16
17
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The Framers did not ignore slavery; they knowingly perpetuated
it. For example, the Constitution insulated the slave trade from
congressional regulation until 1808; 27 the Constitution also required
that fugitive slaves be returned to their owners; 28 and the Constitution
counted slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of computing
proper representation in Congress. 29
The mismatch between the sprawling principles of the Constitution
and the continued subjugation of an entire race was not lost on the
Framers. Jefferson, who penned the very tributes to liberty and equality
in the Declaration of Independence, questioned whether he would suffer
some divine consequence for the Framers’ refusal to extend the sphere
of liberty and equality to blacks in America. 30 Benjamin Rush, who
signed the Declaration of Independence and was a member of the
26

26 This is not an uncontroversial topic. Compare Sean Wilentz, Opinion, Constitutionally,
Slavery Is No National Institution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2015, at A27 (“The Constitutional
Convention not only deliberately excluded the word ‘slavery,’ but it also quashed the proslavery
effort to make slavery a national institution, and so prevented enshrining the racism that
justified slavery.”), and David Post, Puncturing the Slavery Myth, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/09/20/puncturing-the-slavery-myth (referring to the Wilentz essay as “a good antidote to
this myth that not only unfairly impugns the constitutional framers, but (more importantly)
does serious damage to our sense of who and what we are as a nation”), with Lawrence
Goldstone, Constitutionally, Slavery Is Indeed a National Institution, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 17,
2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122843/constitutionally-slavery-indeed-nationalinstitution, (arguing that slavery “dominate[d]” the “spirit” of the Constitution, and that “[b]y
the time the Constitution was signed on September 17, 1787, slavery had indeed become a
national institution”), and Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631 (stating
that in slavery one finds “the roots of American wealth and democracy” and “America’s
origin[]”).
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
28 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842)
(“[W]e have not the slightest hesitation in holding, that under and in virtue of the
[C]onstitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every state in the Union,
to seize and recapture his slave . . . .”).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
30 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, “Rather than the Free”: Free Blacks in
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 20–21 (1991). As Thomas
Jefferson stated, “[i]ndeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his
justice cannot keep sleep forever . . . ! The Almighty has no attribute which can take side with
us in such a contest.” Id. (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 156
(1800)). Frederick Douglass similarly wrote that,

Every slaveholder in the land stands perjured in the sight of Heaven, when he swears
his purpose to be, the establishment of justice—the providing for the general welfare,
and the preservation of liberty to the people of this country; for every such
slaveholder knows that his whole life gives an emphatic lie to his solemn vow.
Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & The Thirteenth Amendment, 45
B.C. L. REV. 307, 320 (2004) (quoting Frederick Douglass, NORTH STAR, Apr. 5, 1850, reprinted
in VOICES FROM THE GATHERING STORM: THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 40, 40-41
(Glenn M. Linden ed., 2001)).
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Continental Congress, acknowledged that slavery is “a vice which
degrades human nature, and [which] dissolves that universal tie”
between men. 31 “The plant of liberty,” he added, “is of so tender a
Nature, that it cannot thrive long in the neighbourhood of slavery.” 32
The Framers threw off the most powerful government of the time,
yet that failed to embolden them to correct this discrepancy in values
and practice. The most they were able to muster was to punt the issue of
slavery to a future generation of Americans. 33 Some Framers held the
optimistic view that slavery would die a natural death with the passage
of time. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, for example, said: “As population
increases, poor labourers will be so plenty as to render slaves useless.
Slavery in time will not be a speck in our country.” 34 Others, however,
“anticipated the possibility that the United States would split into two
distinct political bodies, and that this disunion would occur specifically
along northern and southern lines.” 35 “Should the people of America
divide themselves,” Chief Justice John Jay wrote, “confidence and
affection” would give way to “envy and jealousy,” and the “general
interests of all America” would cede to the “partial interests of each
confederacy.” 36
Decades later, the prospect of the North-South division predicted
by Chief Justice Jay was altogether real. In his March 4, 1861 inaugural
address, Abraham Lincoln acknowledged that the common ties among
the North and South were bending, but urged the people not to “break
our bonds of affection.” 37 On April 12, 1861, the Confederates
bombarded Fort Sumter, drawing the Union into a bloody conflict. 38

31 BENJAMIN RUSH, An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements, on the Slavery
of the Negroes in America (1773), reprinted in AN ADDRESS ON THE SLAVERY OF THE NEGROES
IN AMERICA 1, 26 (Arno Press, Inc. 1969).
32 Id.
33 An exception is worth noting. In 1839, John Quincy Adams proposed legislation
outlawing slavery and forbidding the new admission of slave states into the Union. See
MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 12 (2001). His efforts failed, and it was not until after the Civil War
that antislavery legislation was seriously taken up again. See id.
34 GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS
DIFFERENT 28 (2006) (quoting J.J. Spengler, Malthusianism in Late Eighteenth-Century
America, AMER. ECON. REV., Dec. 1935, at 691, 705).
35 Dawinder S. Sidhu, Judicial Modesty in the Wartime Context, Roosevelt v. Meyer (1863),
39 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 190, 190 (2014). Some of the language in this paragraph and the next
paragraph is drawn from Sidhu, supra.
36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay).
37 President Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2011/03/04/opinion/20110304_Lincoln_Inaugural_Speech.html.
38 Civil War Timeline, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/gett/learn/historyculture/
civil-war-timeline.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
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The “one great” nation was at war with itself. 39 At the same time,
whether man could govern himself, a question at the heart of the
American experiment, was in serious doubt. 40
B.

Need for and Legislative History of the Amendment

The Union states triumphed over their Confederate brethren. In
1872, the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases explained that
once the Union prevailed, “slavery, as a legalized social relation,
perished.”41 Indeed, President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation
“declared slavery abolished” in parts of the nation. 42
But the outcome of the Civil War and the President’s declaration
were not enough, on their own, to assure the Congress of a unified
nation without slavery. “[T]hose who had succeeded in re-establishing
the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit this
great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or
the proclamation of the Executive,”43 the Court stated. Accordingly,
“they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the
Constitution of the restored Union as one of its fundamental articles.”44
To further this interest, the Court recounted, “the [T]hirteenth [A]rticle
of [A]mendment of that instrument” was deemed necessary. 45
The Thirteenth Amendment sprang forth from legislative efforts
that started as early as 1863, and that can be traced back to
congressional leaders such as James Ashley of Ohio. Congressman
Ashley proposed a bill that would amend the Constitution, “prohibiting
slavery, or involuntary servitude, in all of the States and Territories now
owned or which may be hereafter acquired by the United States.” 46 The
proposed constitutional amendment lacked an enforcement clause, but
39 Slavery was the “foundation of the quarrel.” The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 68 (1872). The Civil War, the Court said, boiled down to a struggle between the
“armies of freedom” and an “unlawful rebellion.” Id.
40 The stakes of the Civil War for America and for mankind were well understood. See
President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (“[The founding] fathers
brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing
whether that nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure.”), http://
www.loc.gov/exhibits/gettysburg-address/ext/trans-nicolay-inscribed.html.
41 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 68 (“[S]lavery was at an end wherever the Federal
government succeeded in that purpose.”).
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Vorenberg, supra note 33, at 49–50 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1863) (statement of Rep. Ashley)).

SIDHU.37.2.3 (Do Not Delete)

2015]

12/9/2015 3:12 PM

T H R E S H O LD L I B E R T Y

513

Congressman Ashley proposed an accompanying statute that would
have authorized Congress to enforce the amendment. 47 Senator John
Henderson is credited with introducing the Senate version of this bill. 48
Congressman James F. Wilson offered a similar proposal to amend the
Constitution, one that had two clauses: the first stated that, “[s]lavery,
being incompatible with a free government, is forever prohibited in the
United States, and involuntary servitude shall be permitted only as a
punishment for crime,” and the second empowered Congress “to
enforce the foregoing section of this article by proper legislation.” 49
In 1864, the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator
Lyman Trumbull, drafted a constitutional amendment that also
contained two clauses: “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof a party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States . . .; and also that
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by proper legislation.” 50
The language of the first clause was drawn from Article 6 of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was drafted by Thomas Jefferson, 51
and read: “There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in
the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted . . . .” 52
The Senate Judiciary Committee introduced this bill to the Senate
on February 10, 1864, 53 and on April 8, 1864, the Senate approved the
bill by a 38-6 margin. 54 The bill, however, fell short of the two-thirds
support needed in the House. 55 With President Lincoln encouraging
House members to back the bill and with public opinion shifting in
favor of the amendment, the House ultimately passed the bill by a 11956 vote on January 31, 1865. 56 President Lincoln signed the bill on the
same day. The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified on December 6,
1865. 57
The text of the Amendment contains two sections. Section One of
the Amendment provides: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
See id. at 51.
See Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment
Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 541 (2002).
49 Vorenberg, supra note 33, at 50 n.47 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1863)).
50 Id. at 53 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1864)).
51 See Tsesis, supra note 48, at 539 n.a2.
52 Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, Art. VI, 1 Stat. 50, 53.
53 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1864).
54 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1864).
55 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2995 (1864).
56 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 531 (1865).
57 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/rr/
program/bib/ourdocs/13thamendment.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
47
48
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except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.” 58 Section Two provides: “Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” 59
C.

Early Supreme Court Interpretation of the Amendment

The Slaughter-House Cases represented the Supreme Court’s first
consideration of the contents of the Thirteenth Amendment. In these
consolidated cases, Louisiana granted a monopoly to a slaughterhouse
to operate within a defined space in New Orleans. 60 Other
slaughterhouses had to close, and any butcher who wanted to continue
working in the trade had to do so within the defined area for set wages. 61
A number of these butchers challenged the law under the Thirteenth
Amendment.
The Court explained that the Amendment serves as a “grand yet
simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within
the jurisdiction of this government,” including “millions of slaves.” 62
Consistent with the view that the Amendment protects the human race,
the Court noted that “while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the
Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind
of slavery, now or hereafter.” 63 That is, the Amendment’s reach is not
limited to African-Americans: “[w]e do not say that no one else but the
negro can share in this protection.” 64 The Court made clear that “[w]hile
the thirteenth article of amendment was intended primarily to abolish

58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The “punishment” exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment is relatively rarely litigated. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944)
(concerning punishment for obtaining money with intent to defraud); Arver v. United States,
245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (concerning punishment for refusal to perform military service);
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 330 (1916) (concerning punishment for failure to work on roads
and bridges); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288 (1897) (concerning punishment for
desertion); see also United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (concerning
punishment for failure to meet child support obligations). Recent scholarship on this exception
includes Kamal Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause
and Sexual Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 610 (2008), and Raja Raghunath, A Promise the
Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?,
18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 397 (2009).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
60 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 38–39 (1872).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 68–69.
63 Id. at 72.
64 Id.
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African slavery, it equally forbids Mexican peonage or the Chinese
coolie trade, when they amount to slavery or involuntary servitude.” 65
As to the specific protections of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Court clarified that the Amendment spoke more to liberty than to
equality. Following the Thirteenth Amendment, states enacted “laws
which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens,
and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to
such an extent that their freedom was of little value.” 66 These laws
“forced upon the statesmen . . . the conviction that something more
[than the Thirteenth Amendment] was necessary in the way of
constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so
much.” 67 Accordingly, Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment. 68
With this context in mind, the Court summarized the purpose of
the Reconstruction Amendments, including the Thirteenth
Amendment: “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.”69
By its own terms, the liberty protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment meant protection from both “slavery” and “involuntary
servitude,” and the Court indicated that the latter category includes a
65 Id. at 37; see also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906) (“It is the
denunciation of a condition, and not a declaration in favor of a particular people. It reaches
every race and every individual, and if in any respect it commits one race to the nation, it
commits every race and every individual thereof. Slavery or involuntary servitude of the
Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon, are as much within its compass as slavery or
involuntary servitude of the African.”), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 33 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“The terms of the Thirteenth Amendment are absolute and universal. They embrace every race
which then was, or might thereafter be, within the United States.”); United States v. Nelson, 277
F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2002) (“There can . . . be no doubt that the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibitions extend, at the least, to all race-based slavery or servitude.”). Whites may seek relief
under the Amendment as well. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295–
96 (1976) (“[Section 1981, passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment,] was meant, by its
broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or
in favor of, any race. Unlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens would
encounter substantial racial discrimination of the sort proscribed under [section
1981], . . . Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader principle than
would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly
freed Negro slaves.”).
66 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70.
67 Id. (“[W]ithout further protection of the Federal government,” the condition of the slave
race would “be almost as bad as it was before.”).
68 See id. For more details on the congressional lead-up to the Fourteenth Amendment,
beyond what was summarized in the Slaughter-House Cases, see Aviam Soifer, Review Essay,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger’s History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 670–77
(1979).
69 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
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broader set of harms than the former. In particular, the Court
interpreted “involuntary servitude” to encompass “all shades and
conditions of African slavery.” 70
With this understanding of the Amendment, the Court held that
the state law did not constitute involuntary servitude because the law
did not require any butchers to work; it only set rules for those who
voluntarily decided to engage in the slaughterhouse industry. 71
The Supreme Court’s next substantive opinion on the Thirteenth
Amendment, United States v. Harris, 72 issued in 1883, concerned the
constitutionality of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. 73 The Court stated
that Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment “gives power to
[C]ongress to protect all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States from being in any way subjected to slavery or involuntary
servitude,” and to protect “the enjoyment of that freedom which it was
the object of the amendment to secure.” 74 But, the Court held, the Act in
question went beyond Congress’s power under the Amendment,
because the statute would apply to victims who were not slaves,
including victims who were free white men. 75 This case indicates a
particularly narrow view of the Section Two enforcement power, and
seems to contradict the Slaughter-House Cases’ ruling that the
Amendment protects all, irrespective of race. 76
Id. at 69.
Today, “involuntary servitude” is understood “to cover those forms of compulsory labor
akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable
results.” United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S.
328, 332 (1916)). More specifically, the Supreme Court has defined “involuntary servitude” as
“a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or
threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or
the legal process.” Id. at 952.
72 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
73 Ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985). The relevant text of the
statute made it unlawful to
70
71

conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premises of
another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing to all persons within such
State the equal protection of the laws.
Id.

Harris, 106 U.S. at 640.
See id. at 640–41.
76 This aspect of Harris has been roundly criticized by Thirteenth Amendment scholars.
See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1005 (2002) (pointing out that the
Harris Court’s conclusion that “the Amendment does not and cannot concern the rights of
whites [is] deeply at odds with the enactors’ broad libertarian and egalitarian conception of the
Thirteenth Amendment”).
74
75
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In the next key Thirteenth Amendment ruling, the Civil Rights
Cases, 77 the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, 78 which forbade discrimination on the basis of race
or previous condition of servitude by places of public
accommodations, 79 could be based on Congress’s Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. The Court held that the
former Amendment does not contain a state action requirement and
thus its prohibitions can reach private actors, such as proprietors of
public accommodations: “the amendment is not a mere prohibition of
State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration
that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States.” 80 In other words, the Amendment’s ban on “slavery” and
“involuntary servitude” applies to both state agents and private actors. 81
Because of this, the Amendment possesses the distinction of being the
only constitutional amendment that can directly prohibit private
conduct. 82
Critically, the Civil Rights Cases Court stated that the Thirteenth
Amendment not only “nullif[ied]” slavery, but also “clothe[d] Congress
with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all
badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” 83 In other words,

77
78
79

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
The relevant text of the act provides:

all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude.
Id. at 336.
80 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20; see also id. at 23 (“Under the Thirteenth
Amendment the legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of
slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of
individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not . . . .”).
81 See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 439–40 (1973)
(holding that a private swimming club was covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which Congress
created by way of its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power); see also United States v.
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 175 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment eliminates slavery and
involuntary servitude generally, and without any reference to the source of the imposition of
slavery or servitude. Accordingly, . . . Congress’s powers under the Thirteenth Amendment are
not limited by any analogue to the State Action Doctrine . . . . The Thirteenth
Amendment . . . reaches purely private conduct.”).
82 See George Rutherglen, Essay, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2008) (“The Thirteenth Amendment stands out in the
Constitution as the only provision currently in effect that directly regulates private action.”).
83 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. A “badge” “refers to indicators, physical or
otherwise, of African Americans’ slave or subordinate status,” while an “incident” is “any legal
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the Civil Rights Cases Court held that the Amendment prohibits not
only “slavery” and “involuntary servitude,” by its own terms, but also a
third category of harms, namely the “badges and incidents” of slavery. 84
Despite the addition of this third class of harms, the Civil Rights
Cases Court narrowly construed “badges and incidents” of slavery to
mean only “those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil
freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey
property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 85 As examples, the Court
identified “[c]ompulsory service” and “restraint of . . . movements,” as
among the “the inseparable incidents of the institution” of slavery. 86
Similar to the Court’s explanation in The Slaughter-House Cases
that the Amendment dealt with liberty and not equality, the Civil Rights
Cases Court stated that “the social rights of men and races in the
community” were not the subject of the Amendment. 87 That is, the
Amendment secured personal freedom, but it did not require equal civil
rights nor social interaction among the races. Based on this parsing of
the Amendment, the Court held that denial of admission to public
accommodations related to social rights and thus were not cognizable
“badges” or “incidents” of slavery within the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment: “[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the
ground to make [the Thirteenth Amendment] apply to every act of
discrimination,” such as with whom a person wants to interact or do
business. 88
In 1906, the Court in Hodges v. United States 89 reviewed challenges
to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 90 which prohibited any knowing and
willful conspiracy to oppress, threaten, or intimidate individuals in the
exercise of constitutional rights, including the right to make and enforce
contracts. 91 The Act was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth
right or restriction that necessarily accompanied the institution of slavery.” Jennifer Mason
McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 575 (2012).
84 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
85 Id. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 22 (majority opinion).
87 Id. at 22, 24.
88 Id. at 24. For a discussion of intermediate cases, including Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275 (1897), and United States v. Choctaw Nation, 193 U.S. 115 (1904), see Aviam Soifer, The
Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court,
1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 264–68 (1987).
89 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441
n.78 (1968).
90 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1987–1988, 1991–1992).
91 The relevant text of the Act is:
all persons born in the United States . . . shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, . . . and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
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Amendment enforcement power. Indeed, this statute was passed a few
months after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. 92 The Court
held that the Act was an impermissible exercise of Congress’s Section
Two authority. 93 In contrast to prior cases in which the Court construed
the Amendment to prohibit harms that did not amount to slavery, the
Hodges Court took the strict view that the Amendment prohibits only
actual slavery. To reach this conclusion, the Court turned to Webster’s
Dictionary for the definition of slavery, and therefore the scope of the
Amendment: slavery, the Court wrote, prohibits only “the state of entire
subjection of one person to the will of another,” in which “a slave is said
to be ‘a person who is held in bondage to another.’” 94
Justice Marshall Harlan dissented, as he was of the view that under
Section Two, “Congress may not only prevent the re-establishing of the
institution of slavery, pure and simple, but may make it impossible that
any of its incidents or badges should exist or be enforced in any state or
territory of the United States.” 95 The Amendment, he argued, “not only
established and decreed universal, civil and political freedom
throughout this land, but abolished the incidents or badges of slavery,” 96
defining such badges and incidents, not unlike the Civil Rights Cases, as
race-based abridgments “of the essential rights that appertain to
American citizenship and to freedom.” 97
In 1916, the Court, doubling down on Hodges, stated that the
Thirteenth Amendment “was intended to cover those forms of
compulsory labor akin to African slavery which, in practical operation,
would tend to produce like undesirable results.” 98 The three categories
of harms recognized in the Civil Rights Cases were effectively collapsed
into one: slavery.
D.

Modern Supreme Court Interpretation of the Amendment

In 1968, the Supreme Court overruled Hodges and gave birth to
what federal courts understand to be the current approach to the
security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. § 1.
92 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 804 (1966).
93 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 14–20.
94 Id. at 17.
95 Id. at 27 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 32.
97 Id. at 37.
98 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916).
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Thirteenth Amendment. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 99 the Court
addressed whether 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees “[a]ll citizens of
the United States . . . the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property,” was a valid exercise of
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. 100 The Court
stated that Hodges, which trimmed the Thirteenth Amendment’s reach
to slavery, was out of step with the Civil Rights Cases, which “clothed
‘Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.’” 101
The Court therefore restored the three categories of harms that are
amenable to Thirteenth Amendment Section Two regulation.
Moreover, the Court in Jones held that it is within Congress’s
authority “rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents
of slavery, and . . . to translate that determination into effective
legislation.” 102 Applying this standard to section 1982, the Court held
that the “badges and incidents of slavery” plainly “include[d] the power
to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal
property.” 103
In the 1970s, the Court affirmed and reaffirmed the Jones Court’s
understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment. For example, the Court
held that Congress may use its Section Two enforcement power to
create civil remedies and criminal prohibitions for harms that “extend
far beyond the actual imposition of slavery or involuntary servitude,”104
such as discriminatory conspiracies to deprive another of protected
rights, including the right of interstate travel105 and the right to make
and enforce contracts. 106 Jones therefore drew generous bounds around
the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment and has been reliably followed
to uphold varied congressional action taken under the Amendment.
Indeed, since Jones, the Supreme Court has not invalidated any statutes
passed by Congress under its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
power. 107

392 U.S. 409, 412–13 (1968).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”).
101 Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
102 Id. at 440.
103 Id. at 439–40.
104 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).
105 See id. at 105–06.
106 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
107 See Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 97 (2010); see also id.
at 97 n.109 (listing cases in which federal courts upheld Thirteenth Amendment legislation).
99

100
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While the Supreme Court has broadly blessed Congress’s use of the
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power, the Court has been
reluctant to find violations of the Thirteenth Amendment in the absence
of congressional legislation. 108 The Supreme Court, for example, refused
to hold that “[t]he denial of the right of Negroes to swim in pools with
white people is . . . a ‘badge or incident’ of slavery,” because the
judiciary’s particular “authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to
declare new laws to govern the thousands of towns and cities of the
country would grant it a law-making power far beyond the imagination
of the amendment’s authors,” adding that the Amendment only
empowers Congress “to outlaw” a “badge[] of slavery.” 109 Similarly, the
Court declined to hold that the closure of a street to allegedly cut off
blacks was a “badge or incident” of slavery, as the closure amounted to
an “inconvenience [which] cannot be equated to an actual restraint on
the liberty of black citizens that is in any sense comparable to the odious
practice the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to eradicate.”110
What is the current state of the Thirteenth Amendment? Jones and
its progeny suggest that the self-executing force of Section One of the
Amendment prohibits only actual slavery and involuntary servitude. 111
Section Two, however, “empower[s] Congress to do much more.” 112 In
particular, the Court has enabled Congress to also regulate the “badges
and incidents” of slavery and has subjected such regulations to a
deferential rationality review. 113 A useful summary of the Amendment
108 See Alma Soc’y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1237 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The [Supreme] Court
has never held that the Amendment itself, unaided by legislation as it is here, reaches the
‘badges and incidents’ of slavery as well as the actual conditions of slavery and involuntary
servitude.”); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1219 n.21 (1978) (lamenting the fact that “the
[C]ourt has confined its enforcement of the [Thirteenth A]mendment to a set of core
conditions of slavery, but that the [A]mendment itself reaches much further; in other words,
the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment is judicially underenforced”).
109 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226–27 (1971).
110 City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 126–28 (1981).
111 See id. at 125–26 (“[T]he Court left open the question whether [Section One] of the
Amendment by its own terms did anything more than abolish slavery.”); United States v.
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 184 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting the Court’s “unwillingness . . . to apply Section
One of the Thirteenth Amendment where Congress had not acted under Section Two,” and a
“willingness . . . to affirm Congress’s choices when it had acted under the latter section”); see
also Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217 n.5 (5th Cir. 1997).
112 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); see also Nelson, 277 F.3d at 184–
85 (noting the Court’s decisions that “serve[] to underscore the extent to which Congress’s
powers under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment extend beyond the prohibition on
actual slavery and servitude expressed in Section One”); id. at 185 (“Congress, through its
enforcement power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment is empowered, to control
conduct that does not come close to violating Section One directly.”).
113 See Alma Soc’y, 601 F.2d at 1237 (“Abolition of the badges and incidents the [Supreme]
Court has left to Congress.”); see also Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1801, 1822 (2010) (“The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment assumed that Congress
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comes from Laurence Tribe, who observes that “Congress possesses an
almost unlimited power to protect individual rights under the
Thirteenth Amendment,” and is virtually “free, within the broad limits
of reason, to recognize whatever rights it wishes, define the
infringement of those rights . . . and proscribe such infringement as a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.” 114
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
This Part enumerates federalism and separation of powers
concerns, expressed by courts and scholars, with the Supreme Court’s
expansive interpretation of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power. 115 It also notes that the Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power is in tension with City of Boerne v. Flores 116 and
Shelby County v. Holder, 117 relatively recent cases in which the Supreme
Court announced rather constrictive interpretations of the enforcement
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment,
respectively. As the language of all three Reconstruction Amendment
enforcement provisions are almost identical, 118 as all three had a

would define the badges and incidents of slavery and decide what legislation was appropriate to
eliminate them, and that the courts would defer to any reasonable construction.”); Tsesis, supra
note 48, at 590 (“[Jones] established a low rationality threshold for determining whether
Congress had overstepped its authority in enacting laws” pursuant to the Amendment’s
enabling clause.).
114 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 926–27 (3d ed. 2000).
Congress’s Section Two authority is not completely unbounded. The Supreme Court has
instructed that the Amendment may not be used to “repeal other provisions of the
Constitution,” “strip the States of their power to govern themselves,” “convert our national
government of enumerated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over
every inch of the whole Nation,” “undercut the [other] amendments’ guarantees of personal
equality and freedom from discrimination,” or “undermine those protections of the Bill of
Rights” that are “applicable to the States” pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128–29 (1970).
115 These concerns necessarily intertwine. For example, the ability of Congress to define the
scope of its authority, a core separation of powers issue, could translate into Congress enacting
a broad swath of laws that impinge on State police powers, a federalism issue. For ease of
discussion, however, the concerns have been broken down into two.
116 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012), as recognized in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
117 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
118 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”), and U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”).
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common historical origin in the wake of the Civil War, 119 and as all
three were enacted shortly after one another, 120 recent opinions on the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers may bear on
the current meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power.
A.

Federalism

Concerns that the Thirteenth Amendment would bring about
federal interference with the traditional functions of the States have
been around as long as the Amendment itself. In debates on the
Amendment, proponents of the Amendment openly sought to catalyze
“a revolution in federalism,” and this change was “virtually the sole basis
of the[] opposition to the Amendment.” 121 Even after the ratification of
the Amendment, federalism issues remained. In 1866, for example,
Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania questioned whether the
Amendment would upset “the whole frame and structure of the laws,”
urged that the Amendment “never was intended to overturn this
government and revolutionize all the laws of the states everywhere,” and
suggested that the Amendment could be wielded so as to “overturn the
states themselves completely.” 122
These concerns were shared in the federal courts. In the first
federal court case construing the Thirteenth Amendment, the very first
sentence about the Amendment, written by Justice Noah Swayne sitting
as Circuit Justice, is: “The [T]hirteenth [A]mendment . . . trenches
directly upon the power of the states and of the people of the states.” 123
In 1874, Justice Joseph Bradley, sitting as Circuit Justice, took pains to
contrast the operation of the Amendment with states’ police powers. He
explained that the Amendment “does not authorize congress to pass
laws for the punishment of ordinary crimes and offenses against persons
of the colored race or any othe1r race,” which, he noted, “belongs to the
119 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) (“[T]he one pervading
purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them
would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from
the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”).
120 The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified on December 6, 1865, the Fourteenth on July 9,
1868, and the Fifteenth on February 3, 1870. See Constitution of the United States: Amendments
11–27, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_
11-27.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2015).
121 Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 179
(1951).
122 Id. at 190 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Cowan)).
123 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 788 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
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state government alone.” 124 That said, Justice Bradley indicated that the
Thirteenth Amendment does permit Congress to withdraw from the
States the ability to deprive African-Americans of the “rights and
privileges enjoyed by white citizens,” such as the opportunity to give
evidence in criminal cases. 125
Similarly, and more recently, the Supreme Court in 1971 upheld 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the
constitutional rights of others, but in the same breath cautioned that the
statute does not “apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with
the rights of others.” 126 “The constitutional shoals that would lie in the
path of interpreting [section] 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be
avoided by” requiring evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court
stressed. 127
These federalism concerns have taken on new life following the
enactment of federal hate crimes legislation. In 2009, Congress passed
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr., Hate
Crimes Prevention Act (Hate Crimes Prevention Act), pursuant to its
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. 128 This provision makes it
unlawful for anyone to “willfully cause[] bodily injury to any person or,
through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive
or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person,
because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin
of any person.” 129 Defendants prosecuted under this provision have
challenged its constitutionality, and these challenges have made their
way to the federal appeals courts. Those courts have faithfully applied
Jones, a binding precedent, and based on that application have upheld
the constitutionality of the provision. At the same time, they have also
expressed serious federalism concerns about Jones and its progeny.
In United States v. Hatch, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit heard, and rejected, a constitutional challenge to section
249(a)(1). 130 In this case, a few individuals with varying ties to white
United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897).
Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 596–97 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
126 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971).
127 Id. at 102.
128 See The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/matthew-shepard-and-james-byrd-jr-hatecrimes-prevention-act-2009-0 (last updated Aug. 6, 2015).
129 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012). This provision should be contrasted with 18 U.S.C.
§ 249(a)(2), which was enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause power and contains a
jurisdictional hook. See id. at (a)(2)(B) (providing that the conduct must be “(I) across a State
line or national border; or (II) us[e] a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or
foreign commerce”).
130 United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013). By way of disclosure, I coauthored and organized an amicus brief in support of the United States government in Hatch.
While the amicus brief asserted that Congress’s use of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
124
125
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supremacy had, for five hours, harassed a developmentally disabled
Native-American man by, among other things, branding a swastika into
his arm. 131 The defendants were prosecuted under section 249(a)(1), and
contested the provision’s constitutionality. 132 The U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico found the provision valid, dismissing
federalism objections on the ground that Congress does not infringe
upon powers reserved for the states if Congress acts pursuant to a
delegated power. 133
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit seemed persuaded by the appellant’s
contentions that the Thirteenth Amendment, as construed by Jones,
could not be squared with City of Boerne v. Flores, 134 United States v.
Lopez, 135 and United States v. Morrison. 136 In City of Boerne, the Court
struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—which was passed
pursuant to Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and
which was designed to require States to provide greater religious
exercise protections—insofar as the Act applied to States. 137 In Lopez
and Morrison, the Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s attempts
under the Commerce Clause to regulate gun possession and gendermotivated violence, respectively, warning that to permit these federal
regulations would be tantamount to endorsing a federal police power. 138
The appellant argued that, while City of Boerne, Lopez, and
Morrison all sought to protect states’ rights, “Jones creates a
constitutional loophole through which Congress can enact all sorts of
otherwise impermissible police power legislation,”139 such as
regulations on “racial profiling, racial bias of jurors, and race
discrimination in imposition of the death penalty,” as well as
“education and family life.”140 The Tenth Circuit admitted that these
power as applied in that case was consistent with Jones, this Article argues that Jones is no
longer sustainable. That is, the brief may be characterized as descriptive, whereas this Article is
normative.
131 See United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (D.N.M. 2011), aff’d sub nom.
Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1057–58.
134 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5
(2012). Congress responded to City of Boerne by enacting RLUIPA under different
constitutional powers, though City of Boerne still provides the standard for assessing the
constitutionality of legislative action grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power.
135 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
136 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
137 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511, 516, 531–33.
138 See United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at
551, 564, and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605–06, 617–18).
139 Id. at 1203–04.
140 Id. at 1204 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 29).
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arguments “raise important federalism questions” 141 that “we share.” 142
In doing so, the Tenth Circuit seemed to suggest that section 249(a)(1)
also may operate as an impermissible federal police power. 143
As it was troubled by federalism considerations, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that it could “not blaze a new constitutional trail.” 144 “[I]t
will be up to the Supreme Court to choose whether to extend its more
recent federalism cases to the Thirteenth Amendment,” 145 and “we must
leave it to the Supreme Court to bring Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence in line with the[se] structural concerns.” 146
Duty-bound to follow Jones yet still moved by the federalism
arguments put forth by the defendant, the Tenth Circuit identified three
limiting principles that apparently calmed its federalism concerns and
allowed it to uphold the application of section 249(a)(1) as to the
defendant’s conduct. First, the victim was selected on the basis of race;
second, the injury was committed intentionally; and third, the racially
motivated physical attack could rationally be determined a “badge or
incident” of slavery. 147
While the Tenth Circuit invoked these limiting principles, it would
be a mistake to believe that these limiting principles define the outer
bounds of the Section Two enforcement power—it stretches much
further. First, under section 249(a), a victim must be targeted “because
of” race or another covered characteristic. In a rather infamous case
under section 249(a)(2)(A), in which the beards of Amish men were cut
by members of another Amish community, the Sixth Circuit held that
the “because of” provision requires proof of “but-for causation.” 148 This
suggests, similar to the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, that the victim must be
selected because of faith-based animus.
But the Thirteenth Amendment is not so confined. The Supreme
Court has stated that the Thirteenth Amendment “denounces a status or
condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is
created.” 149 This condition, the Second Circuit explained, “remains the
same regardless of whether a person is subjugated on grounds of race or

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1204.
143 Id. at 1203–04.
144 Id. at 1204.
145 Id. at 1201.
146 Id. at 1205.
147 Id. at 1205–06.
148 United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 590–92 (6th Cir. 2014).
149 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905); see also Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906) (“[The Amendment] is the denunciation of a condition, and not a
declaration in favor of a particular people.”), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968).
141
142
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for some other reason.”150 Accordingly, for Thirteenth Amendment
purposes, a victim need not be targeted because of a protected trait. The
Tenth and Sixth Circuits’ interpretation of section 249(a), as requiring
targeting “because of” a protected trait, cannot be fairly said to represent
the limits of the Thirteenth Amendment. 151 The Amendment reaches
objective conditions without regard to the subjective mindset of the
perpetrator.
Second, the Tenth Circuit’s federalism concerns were also allayed
because section 249(a) has an intent requirement. 152 But as the
Thirteenth Amendment regulates certain conditions, 153 it does not
matter whether those conditions were created intentionally or
knowingly. Leading scholars on the Amendment agree that the
Amendment covers harms regardless of whether the harms are
intentionally imposed. 154 Intent requirements thus may not serve as a
categorical limitation on the reach of Thirteenth Amendment
legislation.
Third, the Tenth Circuit determined that a racially motivated
attack is sufficiently rationally related to the harms to which slaves were
subjected. 155 But the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited to physically
attacking someone on account of race. As the court itself noted, slavery
involved harms so expansive that virtually any harm could be
encompassed within the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power:
“nearly every hurtful thing one human could do to another and nearly

150 United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2002). But see Lyes v. City of
Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1348 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Congress’ authority under the Thirteenth Amendment is limited . . . to the
prevention of discrimination on the basis of race.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707,
711–12 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897) (arguing that what distinguishes a federal law properly
enacted by Congress pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment authority from an “ordinary” state
crime is that the former involves the “interference with that person’s exercise of his equal rights
as a citizen because of his race”).
151 See Miller, 767 F.3d at 603 (Sargus, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Sixth Circuit’s holding
on the grounds that the majority “read[] into the statute an extra, non-textual element,” and
had “[s]pecifically . . . added to the hate crimes statute proof of faith-based animus”); Hatch,
722 F.3d at 1205–06.
152 See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1205–06.
153 See Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216; Hodges, 203 U.S. at 16–17.
154 See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial
Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 87 (2004) (“The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers did
not intend to eliminate slavery and its lingering effects only where they are intentionally
inflicted.”); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 311 (2010) (“Congress could use [its enforcement power
under the Thirteenth Amendment] to outlaw practices that have a discriminatory impact on
racial minorities, regardless of evidence of discriminatory intent.”).
155 See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1205.
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every disadvantaged state of being might be analogized to slavery—and
thereby labeled a badge or incident of slavery . . . .” 156
This is all to suggest that the concerns that animated the Tenth
Circuit’s decision are even more salient in light of the fact that the
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power is more expansive than the
limiting principles of Hatch would indicate. 157
These federalism considerations are heightened in view of recent
Supreme Court decisions. In Shelby County, the Court held that the
formula used by Congress under its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
power to determine which jurisdictions are subject to Voting Rights Act
pre-clearance requirements was outdated; as such, the federal
government could not justify the existing imposition of such
requirements on jurisdictions covered by that stale criteria. 158 Shelby
County indicated that the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power
must be exercised according to current circumstances, not past
realities. 159
This would throw into doubt the practice of ascertaining what
constitutes a badge or incident of slavery with reference to whether the
prohibited conduct has a sufficient “historical association with slavery
and its cognate institutions.” 160 That is, the backward-looking analysis
contemplated by Jones—in which harm addressed by current legislation
is matched against the harms visited upon slaves 161—may no longer be
appropriate in light of Shelby County. As the Fifteenth Amendment is
another Reconstruction Amendment, 162 and as its enforcement power
contains identical language to the enforcement power of the Thirteenth

Id. at 1204.
To be sure, the Tenth Circuit itself disclaimed any attempt to define the “outer limits” of
Jones. Id. at 1201. The point here is to explain that the Tenth Circuit was comfortable
upholding the conviction, despite its federalism concerns, because of three limiting principles;
but those limiting principles do not set the outer limits of Jones and thus federalism concerns
may be more pressing outside of the context of this particular statutory provision.
158 See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630–31 (2013).
159 Id. at 2626–27.
160 United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 189 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Carter, supra note 154,
at 65–67 (applying this “historical nexus” test to the racial profiling context); Larry J. Pittman,
Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment
and Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON
HALL L. REV. 774, 856–57 (1998) (endorsing this “historical nexus” test).
161 This was the precise question in Hatch, where the defendants physically attacked and
branded a victim on account of race. See United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052
(D.N.M. 2011) (“Racially charged violence, perpetuated by white men against black slaves, was
a routine and accepted part of the American slave culture.”), aff’d sub nom. Hatch, 722 F.3d
1193.
162 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (“The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, in
the wake of the Civil War.”).
156
157

SIDHU.37.2.3 (Do Not Delete)

2015]

12/9/2015 3:12 PM

T H R E S H O LD L I B E R T Y

529

Amendment, Shelby County may foreshadow a more restrictive
approach to the Thirteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court. 163
Two other recent Supreme Court opinions are necessary to
mention in the context of federalism concerns with the Thirteenth
Amendment. First, in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court emphasized that the
police power belongs to, and must be exercised by, the States: “[b]ecause
the police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one
national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily
lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the
governed.” 164 In Bond v. United States, the Court explained that leaving
the police power in the hands of the government bodies nearest the
people not only makes sense as a practical matter, but also is designed to
check governmental overreaching as a constitutional matter. 165 Even if
the Court does not construe Shelby County as applying to the Thirteenth
Amendment, these two cases point to the current Court’s more
generalized interest in recognizing and preserving state authority, while
also guarding against federal encroachments on that authority and on
the liberty of the people. 166
B.

Separation of Powers

While federalism concerns with the enforcement provision of the
Thirteenth Amendment stretch back to Reconstruction, the separation
of powers concerns are tied to Jones and thus have less historical

163 See, e.g., Will Baude, The Uncertain Future of the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 16, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/
07/16/the-uncertain-future-of-the-matthew-shepard-hate-crimes-prevention-act.
But
see
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Appellee at 4–7, United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d
492 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-20514) (arguing that Shelby County is inapplicable to constitutional
challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) because: the Voting Rights Act’s pre-clearance requirement
governs states or parts of states and as such presents federalism issues not in section 249(a)(1);
Congress premised section 249(a)(1) on findings of recent bias-motivated conduct; Shelby
County said nothing about section 249(a)(1) or the Thirteenth Amendment broadly; and the
binding precedent remains Jones); Georgina C. Yeomans, Comment, The Constitutionality of
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act in Light of Shelby County
v. Holder, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 107, 117–18 (2014) (reinforcing the first and last of
these points as to the constitutionality of Section 249(a)(1) even after Shelby County).
164 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
165 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“By denying any one government
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the
individual from arbitrary power.”).
166 See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553,
583 (2015) (noting, after a discussion of Bond and NFIB, that “[t]he Roberts Court is heeding to
a theory of federalism, limiting Congress's power as much as possible and elevating the states’
role in regulating various aspects of our democratic system”).
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pedigree. The separation of powers concerns are still significant, even if
recent in vintage.
In Hatch, the Tenth Circuit understood that Jones gave Congress
not only “the power to enforce the [A]mendment, but also to a certain
extent to define its meaning.”167 Indeed, the court noted quite simply
that “[b]adges and incidents of slavery” consist of “conduct [that]
Congress seeks to prohibit.” 168 Because of the vast universe of harms
that were imposed on slaves, Congress may label virtually anything a
badge or incident of slavery under Jones. 169 “In effect,” the court
recognized, “this interpretation gives Congress the power to define the
meaning of the Constitution—a rare power indeed.”170
The Tenth Circuit suggested that, Jones, on its own, raises serious
separation of powers problems. Placed up against other cases, those
problems become amplified. In particular, the Tenth Circuit strongly
signaled that Jones may be tough to square with City of Boerne, which, as
noted above, prohibits Congress from using its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power to create substantive rights. 171 In order to gauge
whether Congress is enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
(permissible) or whether it was creating substantive rights
(impermissible), City of Boerne asks whether Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation exhibits “congruence and proportionality” to
the social harm. 172 The Tenth Circuit seemed to indicate that 18 U.S.C.
§ 249(a)(1) takes from the courts the function of defining the scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment. Despite this tension, the court ultimately
did not strike down section 249(a)(1) for separation of powers reasons,
pointing to the fact that City of Boerne did not mention the Thirteenth
Amendment or Jones. 173
Similarly, in United States v. Cannon, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard the case of three defendants who
were convicted by a jury of violating section 249(a)(1). 174 The
defendants, all white supremacists, physically attacked an AfricanUnited States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1204.
169 Id. While to disagree with Akhil Amar is almost to be presumptively wrong, the Tenth
Circuit’s statement, which portrays a wide-ranging Thirteenth Amendment, seems to suggest
that Professor Amar cannot be right that the Amendment has a “rather specific and bounded
domain” and therefore is closer to the Fifteenth (which he says shares this same attribute) as
compared to the Fourteenth (which he says has “far more sweeping application across the
waterfront of imaginable policy space”). Akhil Reed Amar, Essay, The Lawfulness of Section 5—
and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 120 n.30 (2013).
170 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1204.
171 See id. at 1202 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
172 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
173 Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1203.
174 United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014).
167
168
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American man who was waiting at a bus stop, and repeatedly used a
racial epithet in the course of the encounter. 175 The court acknowledged
that the Jones Court “held that Congress has the authority to enact
legislation necessary to abolish the ‘badges’ and ‘incidents’ of slavery, as
well as the power to rationally determine what those ‘badges’ and
‘incidents’ are.” 176 The defendants argued that Jones had been
undermined by City of Boerne and by Shelby County—the latter a case
handed down just days after Hatch. The defendants also claimed that,
under the seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 177 the courts may
defer only to “the means that Congress uses to achieve a particular end,
but not to Congress’s determination that the end itself is legitimate.”178
The Sixth Circuit admitted that the defendants’ contentions were
“not frivolous,” 179 but, as with the Tenth Circuit, conceded that it could
not overturn Jones. “[A]bsent a clear directive from the Supreme Court,”
the court explained, “we are bound by prior precedents.” 180 Also, and for
the same reason, the defendants’ McCulloch contention was
“foreclosed.”181 In any case, the court added, “Shelby County never
mentioned the Thirteenth Amendment or Jones.” 182 As with the Tenth
Circuit, the Sixth Circuit adhered to, seemingly reluctantly, “the
Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Jones.” 183
These circuit court decisions suggest that following Jones comes at
the cost of the powers of the states and the proper duties of the courts.
Furthermore, these decisions have diagnosed inconsistencies between
Jones—a
1968
opinion—and
subsequent
Supreme
Court
pronouncements on the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. Jones is in need of repair. Specifically, the
Thirteenth Amendment must be read in a manner that does not run
afoul of federalism or separation of powers problems, or of recent
interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments. The next Part offers
a new way forward.

Id. at 495–96.
Id. at 499.
177 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
178 Cannon, 750 F.3d at 504; see Jennifer Mason McAward, McCulloch and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1769 (2012) (arguing that McCulloch permitted broad
deference to the means chosen by Congress to effectuate an enumerated power, but did not
support Congress’s ability to define the ends of its legislation); see also Heriot & Somin, supra
note 12, at 32 (same).
179 Cannon, 750 F.3d at 502.
180 Id. at 505.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
175
176
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
This Part considers and proposes a new paradigm for the
Thirteenth Amendment, one that would allow the Amendment to retain
modern application but still stays within the bounds of appropriate
federalism and separation of powers considerations, as well as one that
is in sync with the enforcement provisions of the two other
Reconstruction Amendments.
This model suggests that sustained limitations on physical mobility
should be the touchstone for a problem remediable by the Thirteenth
Amendment. Put in affirmative terms, the Thirteenth Amendment may
be used by Congress to ensure that individuals possess “threshold
liberty,” that is the liberty necessary to exercise physical mobility. More
specifically, this model posits that Section One of the Amendment, by its
own terms, prohibits “slavery” (direct and indirect limitations on
physical mobility) and “involuntary servitude” (debt-based limitations
on physical mobility). Section Two enables Congress to enact legislation
remedying these types of harms and to address functional or effective
limitations on physical mobility. This alternative approach does not
contemplate authority for Congress to address the “badges and
incidents” of slavery, a category not found in the text of the Amendment
and that serves as an invitation to wide-ranging encroachments by the
national legislature. This Part offers support for this new vision of the
Amendment.
A.

Possible General Approaches to the Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power

In general, the scope of Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment
may be construed in three different ways: first, that Congress may use
Section Two only to “enforce” the specific contents of Section One, as
those contents have been defined by the courts; second, that Congress
may use Section Two, as it can and does now, to define and regulate the
“badges and incidents” of slavery; and third, that Congress may use
Section Two to do something in between pure enforcement and the
status quo. The first and second options are untenable; therefore, the
category that is most supported, and where the future of Section Two
lies, is the third.
First, the extent to which Congress may invoke its Section Two
power is not limited by the specific harms of Section One as understood
by the courts. This is for at least two reasons. First, an enforcement
provision would be superfluous. There would be no need for Congress
to do anything if courts could identify violations of Section One and set
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forth remedies for those violations. Second, the courts, in the context of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, have rejected the notion
that the enforcement clause is confined by the judicially recognized
contents of the substantive clauses. The argument that substantive
harms are for the courts to enumerate and for Congress to then address
was made by Justice John Marshall Harlan II in his famous dissent to a
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power case, in which Congress
had prohibited literacy tests in voting, even though the Supreme Court
previously had found such tests consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. 184 How could Congress prohibit under the Fourteenth
Amendment what the highest Court in the land said was consistent
under that Amendment, he asked. Would Congress not be subverting
both the courts, which have issued constitutional decisions to the
contrary, and the states, which may be subject to such congressional
action, he added. The Court answered, in the Fourteenth Amendment
context, by making it clear that enforcement powers are a “positive
grant of legislative power” 185 that Congress may utilize to “deter[] or
remed[y] constitutional violations . . . even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’” 186 Similarly, in
the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power context, the Court has
said that, “[b]y adding this authorization, the Framers indicated that
Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights
created in [the substantive clause].” 187
Accordingly, any suggestion that Congress’s Thirteenth
Amendment Section Two power must be predicated upon judicial
understandings of “slavery” or “involuntary servitude” fails to comport
with well-established decisions on the enforcement powers of
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. If Congress can do more, the
question becomes, how much?
The second possible approach to the Thirteenth Amendment is
Jones, the current Supreme Court precedent, which says that Congress
can define and prohibit the “badges and incidents” of slavery. The
problems with this approach are several.
First, the Supreme Court has given Congress the power to address
the “badges and incidents” of slavery, but this category of harms is

See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 665–71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 651 (majority opinion).
186 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 455 (1976)).
187 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325–26 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
184
185
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found nowhere in the text of Section One. 188 Where the text of a
constitutional provision is clear, the interpretive matter should be
over. 189
Second, the text of the Amendment already included “slavery” and
“involuntary servitude” as identifiable categories of harms, which begs
the question why “badges and incidents” were not listed as well. 190 The
enumeration itself implies sufficiency, particularly because there are no
words, such as “including,” indicating that the enumeration is merely
representative or otherwise non-exhaustive.
Third, to endorse the “badges and incidents” formulation is to
admit a virtually boundless Thirteenth Amendment. To be sure, there is
ample evidence that the Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment sought
not only to release freed slaves from bondage, but also to remove racebased barriers to the enjoyment of that new freedom. 191 As an example,
within months of the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congress used its Section Two power to prohibit conspiracies to
interfere with certain protected rights. 192 But, even accepting this
original understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment, the “badges and
incidents” of slavery can reach an almost infinite universe of harms
because of the comprehensiveness of the evils visited upon slaves. 193
Simply put, “the badges and incidents” of slavery is anything but a
reliable limitation on the scope of Congress’s power under the
Amendment.
Fourth, the current approach to the Thirteenth Amendment is in
tension with the federalism and the separation of powers concerns
expressed by circuit courts and seemingly heightened by the Supreme

188 See Ilya Somin, The Scope of Federal Power Under the Thirteenth Amendment, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 14, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/02/14/the-scope-of-federalpower-under-the-thirteenth-amendment.
189 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 56 (2014); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16 (1997); cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480, 2495 (2015) (departing from “the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase”
where that plain meaning is “untenable in light of the statute as a whole” (alteration omitted)
(quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994))).
190 See Somin, supra note 188.
191 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883).
192 Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982,
1987–1988, 1991–1992).
193 The original understanding of the Amendment appears broad. See The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) (stating that the Reconstruction Amendments forbade
“oppressions” on the former “slave race”); see also Alexander Tsesis, Gender Discrimination
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1657 n.69 (2012) (noting that Justice
Bushrod Washington’s flowing natural rights rhetoric in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–
52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), inspired sponsors of the Thirteenth Amendment). But that
original understanding is tough to square with current conceptions of federalism and
separation of powers. See United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Court in NFIB and Bond. 194 The courts have attempted to establish
limiting principles that may mitigate these considerations, but as noted
above, the full reach of the Amendment is far greater than these limiting
principles would admit; therefore, the federalism and separation of
powers problems with the Amendment are greater as well. 195
As a result, the two ends of the spectrum—reducing the Thirteenth
Amendment to Section One or leaving the Amendment as is—should be
taken off the table. Accordingly, Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment must rest somewhere between these extremes.
B.

The Thirteenth Amendment and Mobility

Some candidates for the middle path may be the limiting principles
articulated by the Tenth Circuit in Hatch. The Tenth Circuit confined
the application of section 249(a) to circumstances in which there was
targeting because of race, which was intentional, and which was of a
type that has a historical nexus. 196 None of these characteristics delineate
the outer bounds of the Section Two power. Nor should any serve as the
basis, either alone or in any combination, for the middle path.
As to racial motivation and intent, the Thirteenth Amendment is
concerned with a “condition,” or an objective situation. 197 That
condition may exist regardless of the subjective motivation, if any, for
the creation of that condition. In other words, slavery should be
prohibited because of the nature of the restriction on the liberty of the
individual, and that prohibition should not depend on why that
restriction may have occurred. The condition inhabited by the victim
would qualify as slavery regardless of the intent of anyone else. A
remedy for slavery should hinge on the circumstances of the victim, and
not on the mindset of any perpetrator.
As to historical nexus, this factor is an intuitive and attractive
guidepost, but is one that does not hold up on inspection. For starters,
because the Amendment is designed to address certain conditions, the
relationship of the conditions to the past may not be dispositive as to the
See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
Any claim that the Thirteenth Amendment reworked federalism in the United States
would be difficult to reconcile with current understandings of federalism. To the extent that the
Thirteenth Amendment can be read to have adjusted federalism, that modification could be
construed as a temporary, wartime necessity. As that exigency is no longer present and as the
nation has not divided along the northern and southern lines, the justification for a perpetual
change in federalism considerations loses force.
196 See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1205.
197 See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905);
United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2002).
194
195
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problematic nature of the current conditions. Moreover, the historical
harms are so vast that history offers little refinement to the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment. And, in any event, Shelby County places a
premium on current realities rather than historical ties. The Tenth
Circuit’s limiting efforts in Hatch were thus useful for purposes of
reconciling the Hate Crimes Prevention Act with other concerns, but
cannot be enlisted to establish the basis for a refined Thirteenth
Amendment approach more broadly.
Nor should labor or consent serve as that guidepost, despite their
appeal. One may point out that slavery and involuntary servitude
generally required the slave or the peon to engage in labor. 198 A laborcentric vision of the Thirteenth Amendment is too narrow because
slavery and involuntary servitude were not limited to labor. Instead,
they were more appropriately marked by limitations on physical liberty
due to ownership or debt obligations; labor was a byproduct of the
condition, rather than the essence of the condition itself. Moreover,
consent does not represent a necessary aspect of a Thirteenth
Amendment violation, as counterintuitive as this may seem. Aviam
Soifer uncovered a statute—enacted by the 39th Congress, which
immediately followed the Congress that enacted the Thirteenth
Amendment—that prohibited voluntary peonage. 199 This prohibition is
not all surprising when one considers that the Thirteenth Amendment
bans certain conditions. With an understanding that consent does not
undergird the Thirteenth Amendment, a two-way street emerges:
Congress may address certain conditions regardless of the perpetrator’s
motivation or intent, and regardless of the victim’s consent. Put
differently, neither the perpetrator’s mindset nor the victim’s mindset
can cure the unconstitutional conditions that are at the heart of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The enterprise of ascertaining a single guiding principle for the
application of the Thirteenth Amendment seems difficult given the
extent of the subjugation of slaves and debt-based servants. This may
help explain the Court’s willingness to leave to Congress the definitional
function. Given the problems with the current model, however, some
attempt must be made as to line-drawing, complexities aside.
There is ample support for enlisting physical mobility as that
guidepost. For starters, the sheer diversity of harms included within the
ambit of slavery, as well as the attendant hazards of separating out those
198 See Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 437 (1989) (arguing that Reconstruction was animated by an interest in recognizing the
dignity of labor and enhancing the status and rights of the working man).
199 See Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition
of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1609–10 (2012).
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harms, were understood by the Framers of and chief advocates for the
Thirteenth Amendment. Thaddeus Stevens, a leader of Reconstruction
in Congress, acknowledged that “there are many degrees in the miseries
of slavery,” likening the institution to Danté’s “nine circles” of hell. 200
Conceding these degrees, Congressman Stevens nonetheless identified
laws restricting slave mobility as the paradigmatic problem with
slavery. 201 As an example, Congressman Stevens highlighted an 1808
Virginia statute that prohibited a slave from “going abroad in the night,
or running away and lying out,” and that permitted a slave owner to
redress such acts by way of dismembering the victim or imposing any
other punishment short of death. 202
Mobility has long been a quintessential feature of slavery. The
earliest slave codes in the colonies regulated, as an issue of first order
importance, slaves’ physical movements. For example, a 1680 Virginia
statute, a “model” for other colonies, 203 provided that, “no Negro or
slave may . . . go from his owner’s plantation without a certificate and
then only on necessary occasions,” also establishing as “the punishment
twenty lashes on the bare back, well laid on.” 204 The absence of a
certificate, former Third Circuit judge A. Leon Higginbotham noted,
“destroyed” the mobility of slaves. 205 A 1712 South Carolina statute
required slaves to carry passes upon travel, obligating a white person to
whip a slave found without a ticket. 206 The mobility of slaves was heavily
circumscribed because mobility itself was seen as a threat to the order
established by whites. 207
The Supreme Court in 1883 characterized slavery by the
“[c]ompulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint
of his movements except by the master’s will, disability to hold property,
to make contracts, to have a standing in court, [and] to be a witness
against a white person.” 208 “Among the many different forms of
oppression imposed by slavery,” Elise Boddie writes, “the inability of
slaves to choose any manner of space was fundamental.” 209 That spatial
200 Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, The California Question (June 10, 1850), in 1 THE SELECTED
PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS, JANUARY 1814–MARCH 1865 at 120 (Beverly Wilson Palmer &
Holly Byers Ochoa eds., 1997).
201 See id. (noting that these laws were created by “the slave’s worst enemies,” reflected by
slaveholders’ “increas[ing] their burdens, and tighten[ing] their chains,” and were “more cruel
laws” compared to others).
202 Id. at 121.
203 A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 39 (1978).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 171.
207 DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE & THE LAW, 1836–1948, at 51 (1998).
208 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
209 Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 426 (2010).
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control was comprehensive, encompassing rules on where a slave slept,
where a slave worked, and whether the slave could travel beyond the
territory of the plantation and, if so, on what terms. 210 To the extent that
a slave traveled away from the plantation, such movements were
possible only with the permission of the master and even then were
closely regulated. 211
This control of physical mobility was possible because of the
“assignment of a particular sort of meaning to lines and spaces” for
purposes of control—what David Delaney coins “territoriality” in his
careful study of the geography of slavery. 212 Slavery existed, he writes, as
a “geography of discipline and confinement and, for most slaves,
extremely limited mobility.” 213 Indeed, if a slave escaped from those
established bounds, the Constitution, through the fugitive slave clause,
codified the right of the owner to have that slave returned to her
designated space. 214 Spatial control was thus codified in the Constitution
itself.
These lines were patrolled by physical, or direct, and by effective,
or indirect, means. Masters controlled the movements of their slaves
through “shackles, beatings, and threats of violence.” 215 That is, a slave’s
movements were constrained not only by actual legal constraints, but
also by functional constraints, such as violence and threats. Including
functional constraints is consistent with United States v. Kozminski, 216
where the Court made clear that involuntary servitude is a condition
generated not only by physical restraint or physical injury, but also by
psychological threat or coercion.
Mobility is the proper focus of the Thirteenth Amendment because
of its centrality not only to slavery, but also to the other enumerated
category in Section One: involuntary servitude. The touchstone of the
Thirteenth Amendment must be integral to slavery and to the only
other express practice listed in and prohibited by Section One. It is for
this reason that other harms, such as restrictions on property
See id.; DELANEY, supra note 207, at 35.
See Carter, supra note 154, at 63.
212 DELANEY, supra note 207, at 6; see also id. at 35 (“The overwhelming feature of the
spatiality of slavery was that it was designed by whites in order to control blacks.”); see generally
EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL
SOCIAL THEORY 79–80 (1989) (“Space in itself may be primordially given, but the organization,
and meaning of space is a product of social translation, transformation, and experience.”).
213 DELANEY, supra note 207, at 35.
214 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”).
215 Carter, supra note 154, at 63.
216 487 U.S. 931, 942–43 (1988).
210
211
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ownership, contract formation and enforcement, and serving as a
witness, 217 are not viable candidates. As one federal court explained, “the
peon, although practically a slave as long as he was indebted to his
master or employer, without the privilege of changing his vocation or
leaving his master, no matter how small the debt, . . . possessed all the
rights of citizenship, including the right of franchise.” 218
Involuntary servitude, Judge Henry Friendly recounted, meant
“conditional servitude” due to a “previously existing debt or
obligation.” 219 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 220 on which the
Thirteenth Amendment was based, replaced a 1784 draft. 221 The 1787
update, Judge Friendly noted, contained an important additional
provision: “[for] any person escaping [involuntary servitude,] such
fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming
his or her labor or service as aforesaid.”222 This added provision
indicates that, as with slavery, the mobility of the peon undermined the
operation of peonage and, as with slavery, fugitive peons were to be
returned to those with a claim over the peon’s services.
Not all limitations on physical mobility will do. Both slavery and
involuntary servitude were marked by sustained, indefinite limitations
on physical mobility. The slave was a slave effectively for life, except for
manumission or escape. 223 Slavery was inherited, and may have been
passed down for as many as ten generations. 224 A peon was under the
service of the creditor until the debt was discharged. Unlike slavery,
peonage was not a generational phenomenon, but a peon’s service
nonetheless could last for years. 225 This suggests that fleeting or
temporary limitations on physical mobility are not of the same nature as
that which characterized the slavery or involuntary servitude.
The final point to address is how this formulation creates greater
harmony between the Thirteenth Amendment and the other two
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
The Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1905).
219 United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 483 (2d Cir. 1964).
220 1 Stat. 50.
221 Shackney, 333 F.2d at 483–84.
222 Id. at 484 (quoting Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, Art. VI, 1 Stat. 50, 53).
223 See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN
COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865, at 508 (2010) (noting that slavery involved
“[c]ontrol of entry, control of life within, control of exit, whether by manumission or death”).
224 See Wendy B. Scott, Panel Commentary Twenty-Five Years: The Future of Affirmative
Action, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2053, 2055 (2004).
225 See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative
Power, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495, 505 (1993) (quoting a peon’s narrative, in which he
recounts that he was a peon “for nearly three years,” though this term of service was cut short
only because of the efforts of his wife (quoting The Life Story of a Negro Peon, in BLACK
WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 151, 153–55 (Gerda Lerner ed.,
1973))).
217
218
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Reconstruction Amendments. First, as to the Fourteenth Amendment,
while this Article does not address the rationality standard of review, it
does substantially shrink the universe of what Congress can regulate and
is therefore subject to that standard of review, 226 thus making it less
likely, though admittedly not foolproof, that Congress would be
establishing substantive rights in violation of City of Boerne. 227 Second,
as to the Fifteenth Amendment, this model does not ask whether a
current harm sufficiently relates to a harm that was part of slavery,
which may offend Shelby County, 228 but instead asks whether Congress
is addressing extant conditions that impair individuals’ ability to
exercise physical mobility.
In light of the foregoing, sustained limitations on mobility should
be the proper end of Thirteenth Amendment legislation. An essential
aspect of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude,” the two enumerated
harms listed in Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment, 229 are such
extended limitations on physical mobility. For slavery, those limitations
are owed to physical and effective restraints. For involuntary servitude,
those limitations are due usually to debt. A slave’s moments are
controlled by an owner; a peon’s by a creditor.
IV. APPLICATION
This Article contemplates a Thirteenth Amendment that prohibits
sustained limitations on physical mobility, either imposed directly or
experienced due to functional limitations. The Thirteenth Amendment,
in other words, is best understood as guaranteeing “threshold liberty,”
the basic freedom necessary to possess physical mobility. That mobility
is an essential prerequisite to obtaining access to other critical rights and
opportunities in this country.
To give practitioners and judges a sense of how this model would
work in actuality, this Part addresses how a mobility-centric approach
may apply to eight contexts that scholars have claimed are legitimate
subjects of Thirteenth Amendment legislation. It identifies four contexts
that would surpass this revised, more constitutionally sound, Thirteenth
Amendment standard, and four that would fall short.

226
227
228
229

See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626–27 (2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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Harms Congress Can Regulate Under this Alternative Approach

Under this Article’s proposed model, Congress should be able to
regulate the following four issues by way of its Section Two enforcement
power. 230
Sex trafficking involves the transportation of individuals for the
purpose of engaging those individuals in the sex trade. 231 Inherent in
such trafficking is the actual physical movement of individuals for this
purpose, as well as the strict regulation of the individuals’ movements
once transported. This control is possible due to physical violence,
coercion, and threats of violence. And such control is indefinite in
nature. These core elements bring sex trafficking within the bounds of
Congress’s Section Two power, as envisioned in this Article. 232
Domestic violence entails not only physical and psychological
abuse, but also effective control over the victim’s movements as a result
of such abuse. That is, with domestic violence, the perpetrator may
physically enforce the limits of the victim’s whereabouts, and may instill
such fear into the victim that the victim does not feel safe to leave due to
the specter of future abuse. 233 To make matters worse, the victim may
lack the resources to escape her situation. 234 Congress may be able to
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(10) (defining “sex trafficking” as “the recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the purpose of a
commercial sex act”).
232 Indeed, a plausible case can be made that such actions are violative of Section One of the
Thirteenth Amendment because of their close relationship to slavery and involuntary servitude.
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of
Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 812 (1993) (“[P]imps control prostitutes through (1)
physical abuse; (2) physical control of prostitutes’ children, with threats to keep the children as
hostages if prostitutes leave; (3) serious threats of physical harm, including murder; (4) keeping
prostitutes in continuous states of poverty and indebtedness; and (5) ensuring that [they] have
no freedom to move outside unaccompanied.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Nancy
Erbe, Prostitutes: Victims of Men’s Exploitation and Abuse, 2 LAW & INEQ. 609, 612–13 (1984))).
233 See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 365, 370 (N.J. 1984) (countering the “stereotypes and myths
concerning the characteristics of battered women and their reasons for staying in battering
relationships,” which is “most critically, . . . that women who remain in battering relationships
are free to leave their abusers at any time”). Some women, for example,
230
231

become so demoralized and degraded by the fact that they cannot predict or control
the violence that they sink into a state of psychological paralysis and become unable
to take any action at all to improve or alter the situation. There is a tendency in
battered women to believe in the omnipotence or strength of their battering
husbands and thus to feel that any attempt to resist them is hopeless.
Id. at 372.
234 Id. (“[E]xternal social and economic factors often make it difficult for some women to
extricate themselves from battering relationships. A woman without independent financial
resources who wishes to leave her husband often finds it difficult to do so because of a lack of
material and social resources.”).
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address an individual’s direct or functional restriction on the physical
mobility of a domestic partner.
Child labor is also susceptible to Thirteenth Amendment
regulation. Under this practice, a child is required, by a parent or other,
to work in service. Inherent in the practice is direction and control over
the child’s movements. Where child labor is the product of parental
decisionmaking, special considerations exist. The upbringing of a child
traditionally is left squarely with the child’s parents. 235 Parents can
exercise such authority because the child lacks the requisite mental
maturity to appraise or appreciate what is in her best interests. 236
Therefore, a child necessarily exhibits some degree of dependency on
her parents. These factors cut against any finding that child labor is a
Thirteenth Amendment problem. But the extent to which a child is held
in service may bring the situation from one within the proper bounds of
parental decisionmaking to one in which the government has an
interest. 237 The parents may cede at least some of their natural and
constitutional authority, by way of holding a child in labor, to the
government. Where the movements of the child are restricted in service
to that extent, Congress may take up the matter using its Thirteenth
Amendment power. 238 The case is much easier to make where the
person or persons in control of the child are not parents or guardians,
and therefore lack constitutionally protected authority over the
upbringing of the child.
Extreme concentrated poverty is the last of the four issues
addressed in this Article that can be regulated by Congress’s Section
Two power. Pockets exist in the United States where the inhabitants
possess so few resources that they are unable to leave their modest
economic circumstances. Consider that “more than 70% of black
children who are raised in the poorest quarter of American
neighborhoods will continue to live in the poorest quarter of
neighborhoods as adults.” 239 In the south side of Chicago, for example,
individuals in concentrated urban poverty have never left their
surroundings as youths and have made it downtown only as adults. 240
235 See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
236 See Dina Mishra, Child Labor as Involuntary Servitude: The Failure of Congress to
Legislate Against Child Labor Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment in the Early Twentieth
Century, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 67–68 (2010).
237 See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Commentary, Child Abuse as
Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (1992).
238 See Mishra, supra note 236, at 66–67.
239 Patrick Sharkey, The Intergenerational Transmission of Context, 113 AM. J. SOC. 931, 933
(2008).
240 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Unconstitutionality of Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
24–25 (2012).
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As another example, some of the poorest were unable to leave New
Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina, and were thus exposed to the
natural disaster wrought by the storm. 241 Because those experiencing
extreme poverty are trapped in their physical environments due to their
lack of resources, Congress can remedy this absence of physical mobility
by way of the Thirteenth Amendment.
One may claim that extreme concentrated poverty should be
beyond the purview of Congress because poverty is not caused, in whole
or in part, by violence, coercion, or threats of violence. In contrast, one
may say, sex trafficking, domestic violence, and child labor all may
involve such physical or psychological control, or dependence. As
support, one may point specifically to the Court’s opinion in Kozminski,
in which involuntary servitude was defined as a condition that
encompasses physical and psychological components. 242
It would be a mistake, however, to require evidence of physical or
psychological domination as a necessary element to support Congress’s
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. 243 This is because the
proper end of Thirteenth Amendment legislation is a condition. 244 To
mandate a specific manner in which that condition has to occur would
be to graft an extraneous requirement onto the Thirteenth Amendment.
In the same way that the condition need not be race-based, 245 the
condition need not be brought about in a particular fashion. Moreover,
the importance of the psychological element in Kozminski is that
Congress may address a relevant condition, even where the condition
arises out of non-physical and non-direct situations; put differently, a
condition that is the subject of the Thirteenth Amendment legislation
may exist due to functional limitations. The condition that unites
slavery and involuntary servitude, and any other focus of Thirteenth
Amendment congressional action, is sustained restrictions on physical
mobility.
One may also contend that extreme concentrated poverty is outside
of Congress’s grasp for another reason, namely that poverty does not
involve service. But, as noted above, labor is not the essence of slavery or
See id. at 25.
See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942–43 (1988).
243 See Amar & Widawski, supra note 237, at 1381 (stating that, under the Thirteenth
Amendment, “certain private action is banned, but also that certain state inaction is
prohibited”); Note, The “New” Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1294, 1307 (1969) (“Freed of all such restrictions, one may fulfill his aspirations within the
limits of his inner resources. Yet if those resources have not been fully developed . . . he may
still not be a ‘free man.’”).
244 See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968); see also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216
(1905).
245 See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2002).
241
242
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involuntary servitude; instead, it is a byproduct of the control over the
slave or peon.
To be sure, bringing extreme concentrated poverty within
Congress’s power would still put it at the edge of that power. But the fact
that the condition arose because of neglect, and the fact that individuals
need not be required to do anything within that condition, do not alter
the fact of the individuals’ absence of physical mobility or remove the
issue from Congress’s domain.
While this analysis puts emphasis on physical mobility, its
connection to social mobility cannot be dismissed. Indeed, physical
mobility may be made possible by way of social mobility. A battered
woman, for example, may have greater capacity to escape her
circumstances if she possesses increased resources. 246 The poor who are
hemmed in ghettos and are relegated to the shadows of our
communities stand a higher chance of occupying zip codes that are safer
and that have better opportunities if they have increased resources. The
link between physical mobility and social mobility means that this
Article is not inconsistent with calls for the Thirteenth Amendment to
guarantee some minimal economic independence to all Americans. 247
Indeed, to suggest that Congress can use its Section Two power to
ensure that individuals can exercise physical liberty is to suggest that the
Thirteenth Amendment is not only about substituting a condition of
fixed mobility with a condition of freedom, but that it also aims to make
that freedom meaningful. 248 Were the entire work of the Thirteenth
Amendment to be limited to freedom from bondage, the Amendment,
as then-Representative James Garfield noted, would be “a bitter
mockery” and “a cruel delusion.” 249
Relatedly, it must be stressed that an argument for Congress’s
authority to affect these four harms is not an argument for entitlements,
or directly giving individuals more resources and therefore more
prospects for physical mobility. Rather, it is an authorization for
See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 365, 372 (N.J. 1984).
See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 38 (1990) (“[F]or one truly to be a citizen in a
democracy and to participate in the democratic process, one needs a minimum amount of
independence.”); id. at 40 (“Otherwise . . . [the government has] really failed to set the slaves
free—free from economic dependence.”); Azmy, supra note 76, at 1031 (connecting labor,
mobility, and independence).
248 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. also once remarked, “What good is it to be allowed to eat in a
restaurant if you can’t afford a hamburger?” WILLIAM J. WILSON, POWER, RACISM, AND
PRIVILEGE: RACE RELATIONS IN THEORETICAL AND SOCIOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 154 n.38
(paperback ed. 1976).
249 Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337,
1354 (2009) (quoting Rep. James A. Garfield, Oration Delivered at Ravenna, Ohio (July 4,
1865), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 85, 86 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882)).
246
247
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Congress to alter the conditions that exist for these individuals. Take
extreme concentrated poverty for example. This Article’s thesis supports
a congressional power to enhance the conditions of the extreme poor
by, for instance, greater infrastructure, skills-development programs,
and substance abuse treatment.
With a discussion of those four contexts that Congress can affect
by way of a recalibrated Section Two power, this Article now turns to
those areas that lie on the other end of the spectrum.
B.

Harms Congress Cannot Regulate Under this Alternative Approach

This subpart identifies four contexts that generally would not be
appropriate ends of Thirteenth Amendment legislation under the
revised model advanced in Part IV. To do so, this Article breaks down
these harms into three categories: first, those harms that do not relate to
physical mobility; second, those harms that have an indirect relationship
to physical mobility; and third, those harms that involve limitations on
physical mobility, but are transient or temporary in nature. This subpart
gives one example in each category. It also reveals how the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act—the federal statute at the heart of modern discussions
of the Thirteenth Amendment—would fare under this revised standard,
placing it within the last category. This subpart includes an important
caveat: that Congress may regulate these harms if they are severe and
pervasive enough to cause sustained limitations on physical mobility.
First, some harms proposed by scholars as proper subjects of the
Thirteenth Amendment do not relate to physical mobility, and therefore
would fall outside of the model advanced in this Article. Hate speech
generally means utterances that denigrate another individual because of
that individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, gender, gender
identity, or sexual orientation. 250 Bans on hate speech, aside from being
problematic under a First Amendment analysis, 251 are words that
generally do not disable others from moving. The domestic violence
context, by contrast, is one in which the victim may be physically or
functionally confined to a particular space and, because of the actions of
another, may be effectively unable to leave. 252 Hate speech lacks those
spatial considerations. 253
250 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting a local hate crimes
ordinance).
251 See id. at 391 (holding that said ordinance violates the First Amendment).
252 See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
253 This same analysis would apply to the use of confederate symbols, which are said to
constitute “one of the remaining vestiges of the ante-bellum South” and a “badge of servitude,”
which “symbolizes a government whose ideology included the commitment to maintain a
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Second, some harms relate to physical mobility, but the connection
is too distant. Housing discrimination clearly implicates physical
mobility, as an individual who is denied a rental property or the ability
to purchase a home is thereby denied the ability to change physical
locations. On its own, the discriminatory behavior of a particular
landlord, seller, or real estate agent may deprive the individual of one
option for physical mobility. But the individual may still be able to
exercise physical mobility, and retains the capacity for physical mobility,
through the procurement of alternative housing, despite the fact that a
specific housing option may be cut off. That said, this analysis leaves
open the possibility that housing discrimination may be so significant
that the ability of the individual to traverse is meaningless, as it has been
foreclosed completely by others. A poor individual who is discriminated
against in housing in an area where better jobs are located may have no
choice but to return to her modest setting. 254 In such circumstances, the
absence of physical mobility is implicated and Congress may intervene
through the Thirteenth Amendment. 255
stratified society where only whites enjoyed freedom’s bounties.” Tsesis, supra note 48, at 543.
Race-based peremptory challenges suffer a similar fate. These challenges, already prohibited by
law, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), are ones in which an attorney will strike a
prospective juror on the basis of the juror’s race. Such challenges are done, for example,
because of the stereotypical belief that an individual of the same race as the defendant will be
more sympathetic to that defendant, and conversely that an individual of a different race than
the defendant will be less forgiving, see id. at 89 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black
defendant.”). Inability to serve on a jury and perform that vital civic function, and a defendant’s
right to have a properly selected jury, however important, do not relate to physical mobility. In
contrast, a consequence of extreme poverty is being exposed to environmental harms without
having the requisite ability to move to better areas not presenting those environmental hazards.
See Marco Masoni, Student Research, The Green Badge of Slavery, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING
POVERTY 97 (1994). These environmental problems themselves impose no restriction on
individuals’ physical mobility. They are another byproduct of living in such depressed areas,
but are not themselves responsible for poor individuals’ inability to reach other, more
environmentally friendly areas. As a result, this harm on its own, however noxious, does not
seem to be a proper area for Congress to affect by way of the Thirteenth Amendment.
254 The qualitative and quantitative effects of such discrimination may have a substantial,
sustaining impact on physical mobility. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 253 (1964) (referring to evidence that racial discrimination in hotels and motels “had
the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community”).
255 Education also would fall within this second category. Education itself is not a direct
limitation on physical mobility, but modest educational opportunities can facilitate and
perpetuate extreme poverty. See Sidhu, supra note 240, at 20–22. It is a contributing cause and
symptom of extreme poverty, and thereby of limited physical and social mobility. Accordingly,
where the absence of physical mobility is severe enough—that is, where the students are unable
to meaningfully leave their circumstances—the federal government may inject resources and
support to boost the educational opportunities through its Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power. See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (1995). Using that power would send a strong signal that the federal
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Third, some harms may relate directly to physical mobility, but the
limitation on that mobility is not sustained enough to give rise to valid
Thirteenth Amendment regulation. Racial profiling is a key example of
this last category. Racial profiling generally concerns the pretextual
stopping of a car or individual by law enforcement because of the
individual’s actual or perceived race or national origin. 256 There is no
doubt that racial profiling, by definition, entails restrictions on physical
mobility. A car stop, or stopping an individual on a street, both require
the driver or individual, respectively, to be at rest at the direction of law
enforcement. But the stops themselves, also by definition, are temporary
detentions. 257 Accordingly, they are of a different nature than slavery,
involuntary servitude, sex trafficking, domestic violence, child abuse,
and extreme poverty, which all involve indefinite limitations on physical
mobility.
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act, while upheld by each federal
court that has assessed its constitutionality, 258 would, for similar reasons,
be invalidated under the approach advanced in this Article. Hate crimes
can involve attacks on a person that result in restrictions in movement.
The victim in Beebe, for example, was harassed for five hours before he
was released by his captors. 259 This is not an insignificant deprivation of
an individual’s liberty, one that well exceeds typical temporary
detentions of a stop-and-frisk or traffic stop. That said, the victim’s
detention by the three individuals was still temporary in nature, 260 and
did not translate into a sustained limitation. The victim regained his
physical mobility, venturing into a convenience store, 261 whereas the
appropriate subjects of Thirteenth Amendment legislation are those
whose physical liberty is indefinitely absent, where such absence cannot
be cured in a matter of minutes or hours.
It should be noted that, for each of the harms that lie outside of
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power, there may be a
state law that would prohibit the wrongful conduct in question. 262 State
supplementary aid is the result of significant limitations on students’ actual liberty—not
premised on test scores, teacher quality, and the like.
256 See Angela J. Davis, Essay, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 431–32
(1997).
257 Such stops are temporary detentions and qualify as seizures governed by the Fourth
Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968).
258 See, e.g., United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013).
259 See United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1047 (D.N.M 2011).
260 See id.
261 See United States Response to Sentencing Memorandum at 2, Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1047
(No. 10-3104 BB), 2012 WL 1494134.
262 For example, in the case of Dylann Roof, who killed several members of the historic
Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, some are arguing that federal hate
crimes charges are not needed because Roof already faces capital charges at the state level. See,
e.g., Jacob Sullum, What’s the Point of Charging Dylann Roof with Hate Crimes?, REASON.COM
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prohibitions against bias-motivated crimes, false imprisonment, and
assault, for example, could all be deployed against the perpetrators in
Beebe. This is to say that the defendants in these contexts would not be
free from civil or criminal liability; the point is more modest, that the
federal government cannot pursue such liability, insofar as Section Two
is concerned. This respect for the limits of federal power and for state
laws in local matters, as demonstrated by the hate crimes example, helps
reinforce the propriety of this alternative approach to the Thirteenth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Thomas Jefferson referred to the United States as an “[E]mpire of
[L]iberty.” 263 Should that liberty “at any time degenerate” in the country,
he wrote, the nation must draw upon “new sources of renovation” of
those principles. 264 This Article suggests that the Thirteenth
Amendment is a fountain of liberty, one that secured the freedom of
slaves in the wake of the Civil War, and that applies to current
circumstances where basic liberty has fallen below a basic minimum.
That threshold is to be assessed on the basis of whether the individual
can exercise meaningful physical liberty. Physical or direct limitations
on that liberty, as well as functional or effective limitations on that
liberty, may be addressed by Congress pursuant to its Section Two
enforcement power.
This Article has sought thereby to infuse the Thirteenth
Amendment with some contemporary meaning, and to do so in a way
that respects the significant and growing federalism and separation of
powers concerns articulated by circuit courts in Thirteenth Amendment
cases, and by the Supreme Court in the Reconstruction context. It
appreciates the shakiness of the status quo, as well as the existence of
contrary proposals that would read the Thirteenth Amendment out of
the Constitution and reduce it to a historic relic. 265 It anticipates
Supreme Court review of the Thirteenth Amendment and offers a
principled compromise that will hopefully guide future arguments and
decisions in this precarious doctrinal area.
At bottom, this Article is a substantive response to practical
realities—there are individuals who, by affirmative conduct or by
(Jun. 25, 2015, 7:07 AM), https://reason.com/blog/2015/06/25/whats-the-point-of-chargingdylann-roof (“Since Roof already faces nine murder charges in state court, where he will be
subject to the death penalty if convicted, an additional federal prosecution seems gratuitous.”).
263 ELLIS, supra note 19, at 207.
264 Id. at 228.
265 See Heriot & Somin, supra note 12, at 34.
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neglect, do not have the fundamental ability to move, a fundamental
liberty that is the predicate to, and provides a lifeline to, other rights and
opportunities. 266 The “Empire of Liberty” cannot deserve that name if
there are Americans who lack this essential capability. This Article seeks
to restore their liberty to a certain threshold, and turns to the Thirteenth
Amendment for that critical rejuvenation.

266 President Johnson once remarked, “[i]t is not enough just to open the gates of
opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.” President
Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These Rights”
(June 4, 1965), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp.
Today, literally, that ability is not a possibility for some Americans.

